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Introduction 
As studies of international diplomatic history have shown, the rise of a great power has always 
cast a long shadow over the international scene. China is now a rising great power. All of its 
Asian neighbors—from South Korea to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Brunei, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam), from India to Australia, and even across the Pacific to the United States—must adjust 
their foreign policies to accommodate China’s rise. Taiwan is no exception, due to its status as 
the most important territorial and sovereignty issue for China. In this paper, I will briefly 
describe cross-Strait relations under Taiwan’s Ma administration, and then analyze Taiwan’s 
military and economic security. To conclude, I will add my own speculations on possible future 
developments across the Taiwan Strait.  
 
Cross-Strait Relations 
Since 1949, after China’s Kuomintang Nationalist Party (KMT) lost the civil war to the 
Communist Party and retreated to Taiwan, the cross-Strait relationship has endured its share of 
ups and downs. In the early Cold War years, when China was firmly rooted in the Soviet camp 
and Taiwan in the American camp, there was one major armed conflict—the 1958 Quemoy 
Crisis—between China and Taiwan. Other than this conflict, cross-Strait relations in the mid-
twentieth century remained tense, but always short of war. With China’s split from the Soviet 
Union-led communist bloc and the development of US-China diplomatic relations in the 1970s, 
the possibility of war between China and Taiwan decreased significantly. After China embarked 
on its Reform and Opening policy in 1978, geopolitical concerns gave way to a focus on 
economic development. This further enhanced stability across the Taiwan Strait.  
 
When Taiwan started its democratization process in the late 1980s, cross-Strait relations became 
more complicated. Taiwan’s independence movement gained significant representation in the 
country’s electoral politics. Not to be outdone by this new political force, the ruling KMT elites 
(who were no longer dominated by Chinese mainlanders who moved to Taiwan with KMT 
leader Chiang Kai-shek in 1949) changed their China-based ideology to a “Taiwan identity.” 
This social ethos emphasized the “Taiwan-ness” rather than the “China-ness” of Taiwanese life, 
including culture, arts, music, and social and political systems. After President Lee Teng-hui’s 
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high-profile trip to the United States in 1995,  China tested missiles in waters near Taiwan to 
warn against further “drifting away” by Taiwan and international (namely, American) support 
for the drift. When cross-Strait tensions peaked in the spring of 1996, the Clinton administration 
sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area. Nonetheless, Chinese missile tests lasted until 
the eve of Taiwan’s 1996 presidential election, the first ever by popular vote. China saw this 
election as bolstering Taiwan’s separatist tendency, while Taiwan regarded it as a symbol of 
Taiwanese sovereignty. 
 
In the 2000 Taiwanese presidential election, the KMT, which had ruled Taiwan since 1949, lost 
to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), whose party platform strongly tilted toward 
Taiwan’s independence. DPP president Chen Shui-bien’s two terms (2000–2008) saw a further 
deterioration of cross-Strait relations. The Chen administration’s policies, which included 
changing the contents of high school history books and campaigning to join the United Nations 
under the name of Taiwan, were deemed by China as a march toward de jure independence for 
the island. In response, China accelerated its deployment of cruise missiles aimed at Taiwan and 
various antiaccess/area denial capabilities, clearly with future American military operations in 
mind.  
 
KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou prevailed in the 2008 presidential election, and has since been 
reelected in 2012. Since 2008, Ma has pursued a policy of rapprochement with China, which has 
been reciprocated in kind by China’s leadership in Beijing. Under the Ma administration, Taiwan 
has signed seventeen agreements with China on a wide range of issues that have greatly 
influenced Taiwan’s daily livelihood, including pacts on tourism, direct flights, direct shipping, 
judiciary cooperation (for example, extradition), financial cooperation, and food safety. Most 
importantly, in 2010, the two sides signed a free trade agreement called the Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).  
 
China has also somewhat loosened its tight grip on Taiwan’s international space. For example, 
Taiwan can now participate in the World Health Assembly and can have higher-level 
representation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization. Taiwan and 
China have enacted a tacit diplomatic truce that keeps either country from buying off the other 
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country’s diplomatic allies to gain diplomatic recognition for itself. As a result, the percentage of 
Taiwanese citizens who feel that the Chinese government is unfriendly to Taiwan’s government 
has dropped from 62 percent before President Ma’s inauguration to 45.5 percent in November 
2011.
1
  
 
Furthermore, an annual survey of people in Beijing—who amongst the Chinese people are 
presumably the most sensitive to international relations—shows that in 2009, Taiwan was no 
longer China’s top national security concern .2 Before 2008, this annual survey consistently 
listed Taiwan as the highest national security concern for China. A search on China National 
Knowledge Infrastructure Database likewise shows that the frequency of criticism of Taiwan’s 
independence in Chinese military and foreign policy publications also dropped significantly after 
2008. 
 
The Ma administration’s security policy is based on three understandings of current international 
politics, highlighted in Ma’s speech via teleconference to the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies on May 12, 2011. He alleged that compromise, not confrontation, should be 
the main mode of conflict resolution. Cross-Strait rapprochement should benefit both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait and the international community at large, he said.
3
 The efforts made by the Ma 
administration to institutionalize this rapprochement align with Stephan Krasner’s conception of 
international regimes, because they allow both sides to establish “implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which both sides’ expectations can 
converge.”4 
 
Second, the norms embedded in today’s international system allow for the survival of small 
states. This differs from the norms of Peloponnesian or early Westphalian international systems 
when “the strong [did] as they [could] and the weak [suffered] what they must.”5 To make good 
use of this international norm, Taiwan must be perceived by the international community as a 
“responsible stakeholder,” and not a “troublemaker.” Taiwan therefore needs to increase and 
revamp its foreign aid and to participate meaningfully in international activities when 
circumstances permit. These actions will increase Taiwan’s moral weight (or soft power) in 
international politics. 
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Third, the United States is clearly the pivotal power in the US-China-Taiwan trilateral 
relationship.
6
 Given that the United States has a national interest in maintaining good relations 
with China, Taiwan must dissolve any fear of “entrapment” in Washington (that is, America’s 
fear that it might be dragged into conflict with China because of Taiwan). Thus, Taiwan must 
show its resolve and capacity to defend itself, to conduct “no-surprise” diplomacy, and to 
preconsult with the United States on its major international moves.  
 
Given Taiwanese and Chinese efforts as well as US encouragement of these efforts, the cross-
Strait relationship has seen enormous improvements since 2008. Yet, the fundamental difference 
between Taiwan and China remains unsolved. For China, Taiwan’s separation from the 
motherland symbolizes the humiliation China suffered in its modern history, as Taiwan was 
ceded to Japan after the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). Taiwan is the last missing piece in 
China’s unfinished pursuit of territorial integrity. A nominally independent Taiwan is a threat to 
the Chinese regime, as elites have staked their legitimacy, in part, on eventual unification. 
Should those elites somehow permit Taiwan to achieve de jure independence, the opposition to 
Taiwan’s independence that those leaders have fostered may prove their undoing.  
 
Taiwan therefore remains a vital national security concern for China.
7
 On the other hand, Taiwan 
has continued to develop its own, independent identity since it was ceded to Japan. Its ideology 
(first anticommunistic, then prodemocratic), political system, social ethos, and lifestyle are vastly 
different from those of China. The Taiwan identity, though comprised of strong elements of 
Chinese culture (for example, shared religion, language, and festivals), is a mix of democratic 
ideology, capitalism, a victim-oriented interpretation of its modern history, and a strong besieged 
mentality.  
 
The two sides of the Taiwan Strait differ greatly in their approach to solving the sovereignty 
issue. Taiwan has maintained the status quo for quite some time, and it opposes reunification in 
the short term. This is well in accordance with public opinion in Taiwan—the majority of people 
prefer keeping the status quo.
8
  The current Taiwanese government’s policy toward China is 
therefore oriented toward managing and maintaining the status quo. As President Ma has often 
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said, the two sides of the strait should not spend time arguing over sovereignty; rather, both sides 
should learn how to manage their differences.  
 
Ma’s operational formula is “mutual non-denial of the other side’s governing authority,” even 
though neither side can recognize the government on the other side of the Taiwan Strait.
9
 For 
China, reunifying Taiwan with the mainland remains its ultimate goal, though China is otherwise 
conciliatory on a wide spectrum of issues. Therefore, China will not budge on its deployment of 
over one thousand cruise missiles aimed at Taiwan.
10
 On the diplomatic front, China’s opening 
of Taiwan’s international space is designed such that it can be easily reversed should Taiwan 
resume its quest for independence.  
 
The current rapport between Taiwan and China might be disrupted in the future. Taiwan has a 
presidential election every four years, and there is no guarantee that the Ma administration’s 
policy will be followed by future administrations. China may get impatient with limited progress 
toward the “great unification enterprise.” For example, Luo Yuan, a retired People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) major-general who is widely regarded as the spokesperson for the PLA’s stance on 
political issues, has commented on China’s progress since the beginning of the Ma 
administration:  
 
Though we have released a lot of goodwill, the proportion of people in Taiwan who 
support reunification doesn’t seem to rise, the proportion for Taiwan Independence 
doesn’t seem to drop . . . maintaining permanent status quo is tantamount to peaceful 
secession . . . Ma’s “No Unification, No Independence, No Use of Force” is the 
embodiment of peaceful secession. We haven’t solved the fundamental conflict. We want 
peace, yet we will never forget war. The PLA has to take initiative.
11
  
 
As China grows stronger—as it did after the 2008 global financial crisis—it may become 
overconfident. Therefore, a coercive threat to Taiwan is not totally unfathomable.  
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Military Security 
The Ma administration has repeatedly said that Taiwan must deter China from using force to 
change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. The first component of Taiwan’s deterrence 
strategy is to send loud and clear signals to China and the rest of the international community 
that the Ma administration will pursue neither Taiwan’s independence nor its reunification. 
Taiwan wants to maintain its status quo—hence the administration’s slogan, “No reunification, 
no independence, no use of force.” The “no independence” pillar is intended to avoid giving 
China any excuse to attack Taiwan.  
 
The second component of Taiwan’s deterrence strategy is to deny China any political gains that 
might come from attacking Taiwan. This component results from changing circumstances in the 
Taiwan Strait. First of all, America’s relative decline vis-à-vis China has granted China greater 
weight in the US-China-Taiwan triangular relationship. Moreover, the military balance across 
the Taiwan Strait has tilted in favor of China for the past decade or so. Taiwan is essentially 
defenseless against Chinese cruise missiles, and it is losing air superiority.  
 
For political and military reasons, Taiwan simply does not have the first-strike advantage; this 
advantage is important for a small power such as Taiwan to counteract a larger power such as 
China, even if Taiwan knows China is about to launch a military attack. Deterrence by denial 
functions by preventing China from physically occupying Taiwan, thus keeping China from 
achieving political goals associated with a rapid offensive attack. That is, China can wreak havoc 
on Taiwan’s economy with cruise missiles, bombing, and other tactics, but Taiwan must 
demonstrate that such strikes will not bend its will, and that it will not let the PLA land on its 
soil.
12
 The third component of Taiwan’s deterrence strategy is diplomacy, meaning Taiwan must 
project itself as a “responsible stakeholder” in the international community in the hopes that 
international public opinion can constrain China’s potential military action.  
 
Successful execution of this deterrence strategy depends on a host of other variables ranging 
from how the United States would exert its role as a pivotal deterrent force in a cross-Strait crisis, 
to the resolve Taiwan may demonstrate when facing an attack from China, to force-to-space ratio, 
to the quality and quantity of armaments and personnel. It is difficult to evaluate these intangible 
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variables given that China has yet to show any aggressive intentions toward Taiwan. But one 
long-term, concrete factor that is of crucial importance to Taiwan’s military security is its 
graying population. According to a research report conducted by the Council of Economic 
Planning and Development, Taiwan’s current population is 23.2 million; but, in 2060, it will 
dwindle to 18.8 million. This means Taiwan’s population growth rate would drop from positive 2 
percent in 2010 to negative 11.6 percent in 2060.
13
  
 
The working-age population in Taiwan (between fifteen and sixty-four years old) in 2010 
accounted for 73.6 percent of the total population, but will account for only 49.2 percent in 2060. 
In terms of sheer numbers, the working-age population was 17 million in 2010 and will be only 
9.8 million in 2060. This worsening demographic trend poses two problems for Taiwan’s 
national security. For one thing, there will be a smaller and smaller pool of individuals upon 
which an all-volunteer military system can be based (the Ma administration is currently moving 
toward this system). Moreover, as the population grays, an increasing share of resources will by 
necessity be siphoned off to support welfare programs, while a shrinking population will have a 
dampening effect on economic growth. In effect, relatively fewer resources will be allocated to 
the military. Sooner or later, Taiwan will have to face a stark choice between butter and guns.
14
 
 
Economic Security 
China is now Taiwan’s largest trading partner, its largest destination of Taiwanese foreign 
investment, and its largest source of foreign reserves. With the signing of the ECFA in 2010, 
these trends are likely to continue. The immediate question regarding Taiwan’s national security 
is whether China will leverage Taiwan’s dependence on the mainland market to exact political 
concessions from Taiwan. Any analysis of this question must start with Albert O. Hirschman’s 
political-economic bargaining model. In a classic study of economic and political bargaining 
power, Hirschman discovered that a strong state with a large market can bargain for political 
gains with a small state that relies on the strong state’s domestic market (the trade-disruption 
hypothesis).
15
 For example, he found that Eastern European states were subservient to 
Germany’s political demands during the interwar years. Hirschman’s model and examples are 
instinctively convincing. And, indeed, in the debates prior to the signing of the ECFA, the DPP’s 
official line in opposing the ECFA followed Hirschman’s style of reasoning. 
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A deeper probe into Hirschman’s argument shows that his bargaining model is indeterminate. 
Theoretically, benefits of trade accrue to both sides of the trading relationship. If the strong side 
(for example, China) intends to threaten the trading relationship in order to exact further 
demands from the weaker side (for example, Taiwan), for the weaker side, this is tantamount to 
blackmail. The weaker side’s response to this situation may be indeterminate. If the weaker side 
has something desirable to the stronger side, the stronger side may receive greater benefit from 
buying off the weaker side than from blackmailing it.
16
 In Hirschman’s examples, empirically, 
the Eastern European small states’ concessions to Germany might not be the result of Germany’s 
market-induced bargaining power, but the result of Germany’s imposing military strength.  
 
Furthermore, if Germany had been able to exact political concessions from its small neighbors, it 
might have successfully done so because of the trading blocs of the interwar international 
economy. Eastern European small states were forced to concentrate their trade within the Mark 
Bloc dominated by the German currency of that name, thus making them susceptible to German 
pressure. The trade pattern between Germany and small states in Eastern Europe was also made 
possible by the special banking account arrangements between Germany and its small trading 
partners that controlled the financing of trade flows.
17
 Neither trading blocs nor special banking 
accounts exist in the current international economy, hence, China’s economic interdependence-
induced bargaining power over Taiwan may not be as strong as some observers suggest.  
 
While the necessary conditions of Hirschman-style influence do not pertain today, this does not 
mean that China has no influence on Taiwan as a result of their trading relationship. The extent 
of China’s influence is, in fact, indirect. Any trading relationship creates losers and winners in 
the economy of each trading partner, as the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem predicts. Those who 
benefit from trade presumably prefer a smoother (political) relationship with the trading partner, 
while those who suffer because of foreign trade may have different preferences. In the past, 
weaker states in asymmetrical trade relationships frequently had public debates about the worth 
of pursuing trade with stronger states, demonstrated in the dyads of the seventeenth-century: the 
Netherlands and England, Czechoslovakia and Germany during the interwar years, and Finland 
and Russia since the 1930s.  
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Put simply, the stronger state’s influence on its smaller trading partner is not exerted through 
direct bargaining pressure, but indirectly through the political preferences of those benefitting 
from the trading relationship in the smaller country.
18
 And as the experiences of former Soviet 
bloc countries in their trade relations with Russia suggest, the national interests of small states 
can be redefined accordingly.
19
 Given the trade-to-gross-domestic-product ratio of   Taiwan 
(about 142 percent), there is no dearth of people in Taiwan’s electorate who aspire to a smooth 
relationship with China (but obviously not to the degree of reunification, according to all the 
polls). Moreover, increased trade interdependence (for the smaller state in a trading dyad, this 
means increased asymmetrical interdependence) gives the stronger side a mechanism through 
which it can signal its discontent on a bilateral issue at stake without fearing escalation of 
tensions and risking war.
20
   
 
The Hirschman-type threat of disrupting trade for political purposes, if carried out, would be 
heavy handed. A more nuanced way to conduct economic statecraft is through economic 
sanctions on a selective basis. But the effectiveness of economic sanctions is a perennial subject 
of academic debates. A standard-bearer research project finds that economic sanctions fail more 
often than not in achieving the sanctioning country’s stated political goals with regard to the 
country being sanctioned.
21
 However, this conclusion has much to do with how “effectiveness” 
is conceptualized and measured. Sometimes, economic sanctions that might appear to have failed 
were actually quite successful in achieving some “unintended consequences” that would benefit 
the sanctioning country.
22
   
 
A thorough study of possible Chinese economic sanctions against Taiwan demonstrates that the 
effectiveness of Chinese sanctions against Taiwan would depend on Taiwan’s reaction to those 
sanctions.
23
 Furthermore, the production networks between China and Taiwan would protect 
against economic sanctions on Taiwan because of the cost China may incur for its own economy. 
For example, in 2010, electric and electronic products (Chapter HS85 products) constituted 
almost 40 percent of Taiwan’s total exports and nearly one fourth of China’s exports. The 
production network of electric and electronic products between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait 
has been well-documented. Thus, a Chinese sanction against Taiwan’s most competitive industry 
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in the global market will certainly hurt Taiwan most, but it is also likely to have deleterious 
boomerang effects on China’s own economy.  
 
Trade liberalization is important for Taiwan’s security. Increased trade with other countries 
would make Taiwan’s economy more important for these countries, thus helping make Taiwan 
less susceptible to Chinese economic coercion. Also, with Taiwan’s trade competitors (South 
Korea in particular) signing free trade agreements (FTAs) in lieu of the stalled Doha-round talks, 
Taiwan is losing its competitive edge in some of its key export industries. Furthermore, since 
finishing negotiations for accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, Taiwan has 
achieved very little in further liberalizing its international trade. In the past, this has partly been 
because of China’s implicit pressure on third-party countries. But since Taiwan signed the ECFA 
with China in 2010, China has reduced its pressure on third-party countries in its attempt to 
conduct FTA negotiations with Taiwan. As a result, Singapore and New Zealand have 
announced their intentions to explore the possibility of negotiating FTAs with Taiwan. 
 
The main obstacle to Taiwan having more FTA talks with other countries remains Taiwan’s 
trade-related political infrastructure. More specifically, Taiwan’s trade negotiators simply do not 
have the political backing needed to conclude trade talks. Whatever they promised at the trade 
negotiation table would be overturned by legislators who, like their counterparts in many other 
democracies, are more subservient to special interest groups than to national interests. Partisan 
politics in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) are particularly bitter—the opposition party’s job is 
to oppose, or dispose of, whatever the executive branch has to propose.  
 
On top of this is the tendency of individual legislators to micromanage administrative affairs. 
Not to be outdone by their counterparts in the LY, members of Taiwan’s Control Yuan 
(Censurate) are sure to hold interpellation sessions to probe any possible administrative 
malfeasance by the trade negotiators should the negotiators make trade concessions. Foreseeing 
all these troubles, political appointees have not been willing to provide political support to their 
subordinates who now have to face pressure not only from foreign negotiators but from domestic 
flanks. Thus, in the past decade, Taiwan’s trade negotiators’ behavioral pattern has been to recite 
12 
 
official lines to foreign negotiators in any particular issue area that is under negotiation. They 
simply do not have any room to conduct give-and-take negotiations.  
 
Unless there is some serious revamping of trade-related institutions, there will not be any FTAs 
for Taiwan (Taiwan’s ECFA with China being the exception). Any institutional revamping 
should follow the model laid out in the US Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act passed by the US 
Congress in 1934. This act stipulates that before any major trade negotiation, the executive 
branch needs to seek authorization from Congress to conduct negotiations. Once a trade 
agreement is reached between the United States and foreign negotiators, it will be subject to an 
up-or-down vote in Congress. 
 
Congress cannot make any changes to the trade agreement. This process at least assures foreign 
governments that American trade negotiators are serious in giving and taking. Otherwise, foreign 
governments would have no incentive to negotiate in the first place. The Reciprocal Tariff 
Agreement Act (RTAA) changed the power dynamics in trade issues by forcing Congress to pass 
a collective judgement based on national interest considerations, rather than on individual 
legislators’ propensity for micromanagement. The RTAA has since served as the political 
foundation for America’s future trade liberalization.24 It is clear that Taiwan will need to have a 
similar arrangement for its international trade negotiation.  
 
If unable to ratify FTAs, the Taiwanese government should instead finance exporters. Since 
exports can incur some high risks, government financing to exporters can socialize the risks. For 
most trading states, export financing is provided through export-import banks. The export-import 
banks’ capital comes from country treasuries. But Taiwan’s Export-Import Bank of the ROC is 
run as a regular bank, as regulated by the country’s Ministry of Finance. The Export-Import 
Bank has to avoid risks itself; that is, it does not have the function of socializing risks for 
exporters, and hence is not very useful in promoting trade. In comparison, the outstanding loan 
volume of South Korea’s Export-Import Bank is twenty times that of the Export-Import Bank of 
the ROC, although Korea’s merchandise export value is only 1.8 times that of Taiwan.  
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It should be noted that, realistically, no amount of trade liberalization through FTAs or 
government exports financing can make a significant dent in Taiwan’s reliance on the Chinese 
mainland market, which together with Hong Kong accounted for about 42 percent of Taiwan’s 
total exports market in 2010. Trade, after all, is a function of geography. It should be emphasized 
that the value of FTAs and sound government financing for exports is to enhance Taiwan’s 
position in East Asian production networks, making Taiwan more valuable to its trading partners, 
including China. 
 
Conclusion: A Few Speculations 
I want to make two speculations about factors that might have tremendous implications for 
Taiwan’s security, both of which are “institutional” factors that allow for some rough guesswork. 
First, Taiwan is a democracy that holds periodic presidential and legislative elections. Future 
administrations might not agree with the grand strategy chosen by the current administration, 
hence changing the political premises the Ma administration relies upon to shore up Taiwan’s 
security. More specifically, how would China react if a future Taiwanese administration were to 
deny the 1992 Consensus—the very device the Ma administration and Beijing use to paper over 
their differences on China’s One-China Principle— so that both sides can proceed with 
rapprochement?  My conjecture is that China would develop a tit-for-tat strategy rather than look 
the other way. That is, if Taiwan makes the first move to deviate from the consensus, China will 
respond with a retaliatory move.  
 
For example, in its 2012 presidential campaign, the DPP made it clear that once in power, it will 
not recognize the 1992 Consensus. This prompted Wang Yi, head of the Taiwan Affairs Office 
of China’s State Council, to state that “if the foundation of cross-Strait rapprochement is emptied 
out, then the fruits enjoyed so far by both sides of the Strait may no longer be there.”25 There are 
two reasons for this. First of all, the denial of the “1992 Consensus” by a future Taiwanese 
administration would be regarded by China as a failure of its current rapprochement policy 
toward Taiwan. Under these circumstances, China would have difficulty letting the Taiwanese 
administration pursue this policy. Furthermore, a relaxed response to the denial of the 1992 
Consensus could lead to Taiwan’s distancing itself further from the One China Principle. A tit-
for-tat strategy by China could easily elicit a tit-for-tat response from Taiwan. Cross-Strait 
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relations could therefore revert back to the state of tension we observed from the mid–1990s 
through 2008. Added to this is the unknown quality of China’s new leadership, set to assume 
power in 2012–2013. How the attitude of this generation of leaders toward Taiwan will interact 
with the PLA’s views and with the situation in Taiwan is an open question. 
 
The second factor that might derail Taiwan’s security is the rise of grass-roots nationalism in 
China and its impact on Chinese foreign policy. Though China has yet to conduct concrete 
diversionary behavior in international politics—stoking external conflict to divert attention from 
domestic problems—the impact on China’s nationalistic foreign policy is not to be ignored.26 
Many observers believe that China’s nationalism was at least partially responsible for its 
assertive diplomacy in 2009–2010.27  In the long run, one could expect nationalism to be more 
active in China.  
 
As research by Mansfield and Snyder shows, when a country begins democratizing its political 
system, nationalism—and aggressive foreign policy—start to become staple characteristics of 
that country.
28
 This is because in the face of new political forces that compete with the weakened 
old elite for the power to run government, both the old elite and new political forces embrace 
nationalism as a rallying cry for political support. As China’s economy and society continue to 
develop, its one-party authoritarian political system is coming under strain and will have to 
adjust to new realities. In the long run, increased democratization of China’s political system is 
not totally unimaginable. Indeed, we have already seen rising nationalism dovetail with 
economic and social changes in China. Whether and when China’s rising nationalism will direct 
its ire toward Taiwan is a topic to which we need to pay close attention. 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1
 “Public Views on Current Cross-Strait Relations,” Routine Opinion Polls, Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of 
China, www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/112299261153.pdf (accessed August 2012).       
2
 Iain Johnston, Personal Correspondence (Department of Government, Harvard University, 2009).  
3
 Ying-jeou Ma, “Building National Security for the Republic of China” (speech by video conference, Center for 
3
 Ying-jeou Ma, “Building National Security for the Republic of China” (speech by video conference, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies,  Washington, DC, May 12, 2011, 
http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=24284&rmid=2355. 
4
 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” in International Regime, ed. Stephen D. 
Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983): 1–22. 
5
 Robert B. Strassler and Victor Davis Hanson, The Landmark Thucydides (Revised Edition, Free Press: 2008).  
15 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6
 Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003): 169–201. 
7
 Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 245–69. 
8
 Admittedly, both the United States and China have their different definitions of what constitutes status quo in the 
Taiwan Strait.  
9
 “President Attends Symposium to Commemorate Professor Qiu Hongda,” (speech, Taipei, Taiwan, May 23, 2012), 
www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=27249&rmid=514 (accessed September 21, 2012). 
10
 China says its deployment of cruise missiles aimed at Taiwan is for deterrence against the Taiwan independence 
movement, meaning it is defensive in nature. Yet, Taiwan feels very threatened. Taiwan therefore needs to purchase 
advanced weapons for self defense. China feels that the weapons would give Taiwan confidence to move toward 
independence, which is a national security threat to China; hence, defensive weapons in Taiwan’s hands could serve 
offensive purpose. Objectively speaking, since Taiwan has neither the capability nor the intention to attack China, 
China should not be caught in this security dilemma. But as Robert Jervis, Richard Lebow, and Janice Stein show, 
the psychology of deterrence sometimes really can be nonsensical. See, for example, Robert Jervis, , Richard Ned 
Lebow, and Janice Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), and 
Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167–214.  
11
 Yuan Luo, “Full Text of Speech by Major General Luo Yuan on the Taiwan Issue” (speech, Beijing, China, 
November 21, 2009), http://news.backchina.com/printnews.php?tid=65532&c_lang=big5 (accessed June 6, 2012). 
Many Chinese academics closely associated with the PLA, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Chinese 
Ministry of National Security have also expressed the same impatience.  
12
 The argument here is essentially one about the efficacy of coercive airpower—can bombing alone bring the target 
country to its knees? While there are many different assessments, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization bombing 
campaign during the Kosovo War sheds some new light on this question. The other side of the argument is about 
Taiwan’s military preparedness—can Taiwan prevent an amphibious landing from China? See Daniel R. Lake, “The 
Limits of Coercive Airpower,” in International Security 34, no. 1 (Summer 2009): 83–112.  
13
 “Taiwan Population Forecast, 2010–2060,” Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, 
Republic of China, 2011. 
14
 It should be noted that many countries face this problem. But Taiwan’s problem is particularly severe, as it has 
one of the lowest birth rates in the world. And the threat it faces is more acute than those in most other countries. For 
general information about this problem, see Neil Howe and Richard Jackson, eds., The Graying of the Great Powers 
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008).  
15
Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1980).  
16
 Harrison R. Wager, “Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence,” International 
Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 461–83. 
17
 Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
18
 A relevant work is Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).  
19
 Rawi Abdelal, National Purposes in the World Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
20
 James D. Morrow, “Assessing the Role of Trade as a Source of Costly Signals,” in Edward D. Mansfield and 
Brian Pollins, eds., Economic Interdependence and International Conflict (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 
Press, 2003): 89–95.  
21
 Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (Washington, DC: 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009). 
22
 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). 
23
 Murray Scot Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion against Taiwan: A Tricky Weapon to Use (Santa Monica, CA: 
Rand Publishing, 2007).  
24
 Stephan Haggard, “The Institutional Foundations of the Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act of 1934,” International Organization 42, no. 1 (Winter 1985): 91–119.  
25
 Wang Yi, Opening Remarks (Taiwan Week Festival, Chongqing City, China, November 17, 2011). 
26
 Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2007). 
27
 Michael D. Swaine and Taylor Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behavior—Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,” in 
China Leadership Monitor, no. 35 (2011), www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor (accessed June 6, 
2012). 
28
 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go To War (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2005). 
